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Abstract  
   The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  analyse  the  relation  between  a  company’s  
leverage  and  its  performance  during  the  financial  crisis  of  2007-­2009.  A  hypothesis  
is   proposed   that   leverage   would   negatively   impact   abnormal   return   during   the  
financial  crisis.  Interestingly,  it  is  found  that,  at  the  peak  of  the  crisis,  during  2008,  
firms  with  higher  leverage  performed  better.  The  opposite  effect  is  found  in  2009,  
when   firms  with  high   leverage  under-­performed.  These  results  seem  somewhat  
counter-­intuitive,   so   that   after   taking   into   account   industry   effects   the   results  
indicate  that  leverage  had  a  negative  effect  on  companies’  performance  during  the  
2008-­2009  period.    
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1.  Introduction    
1.1   Leverage  level  and  stock  return    
There  are  two  main  reasons  for  firms  to  use  leverage.  First,   it   is  the  debt  
raised   to   finance   the   firms’   operation.   Second,   as   a  more   speculative   avenue,  
leverage  may  be  used  by  firms  as  an  investment  strategy  or  investment  in  financial  
instruments.  The  objective  of  both  is  to  increase  the  return  on  investment.    
The   severe   economy   recession   in   the   fall   of   2008   was   caused   by   the  
tightening  of   credit   as  well   as   the  collapse  of   subprime  mortgages  and  various  
types  of  securitized  products,  both  of  which  had  peaked  in  mid-­2007.  This  collapse  
tossed  financial   institutions  like  Lehman  Brothers  and  Washington  Mutual   into  a  
serious  solvency  and  liquidity  issues  in  mid-­  to  late-­2008.  Shortly  after,  the  liquidity  
and   solvency   issues   of   the   financial   sector   were   eased-­up   by   a   variety   of  
government  actions.  However,  the  prices  of  most  asset  classes  and  commodities  
still   fell   drastically   throughout   most   of   2009,   and   there   was   a   high   volatility  
throughout  2007-­2009.    
Based  on  the  above  events,  this  study  is  aimed  to   learn  whether  a  firm’s  
leverage  has  an  impact  on  its  performance.  There  were  numerous  researches  on  
the  effect  of   leverage  on   returns   (e.g.,  Bhandri,  1998;;  Opler  and  Titman,  1994;;  
Fama  and  French,  1992,  1995),  but  very  few  studies  focused  on  the  2008  financial  
crisis.  By  definition,  it  would  seem  that  high  leverage  firms  would  be  more  affected  
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by  the  financial  crisis,  as  it  could  have  impeded  their  ability  to  continue  to  fund  their  
operation.  This  study  aims  to  test  if  that  was  indeed  the  case.    
This  paper  examines  the  effect  of  different  leverage  levels  on  risk-­adjusted  
stock  returns  (excluding  companies  in  the  financial  and  utility  sectors)  during  the  
financial   crisis.   Our   hypothesis   is   that,   in   2008,   companies   with   high   leverage  
performance  were  in  a  worse  condition,  compared  with  those  with  low  leverage,  
because  of  the  severe  liquidity  issues  forcing  them  to  downsize  or  sell  assets  to  
meet  their  credit  requirement.    
Our  study  result  partially  proves  our  hypothesis.  According  to  the  test  
result,  there  is  a  significant  difference  of  mean  returns  among  leverage  groups.  
Results  also  show  that  there  is  no  significant  difference  in  abnormal  return  
between  certain  higher  leverage  and  lower  leverage  firms.  This  paper  proceeds  
as  follows.  In  section  2,  we  review  the  literature.  Section  3  describe  the  data  and  
empirical.  Section  4  provides  the  empirical  results.  Section  5  gives  conclusion  
based  on  test  results.  Section  6  contents  the  test  results  in  tables  and  figures.      
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2.  Literature  review    
2.1  Capital  Structure  
Capital  structure   refers   to   the  way   in  which  a   firm   finances   its  assets.   In  
essence,   it   is   the   interaction   between  debt   and   equity   financing.   The   theory   of  
capital   structure   started   with   a   seminal   work   of   Modigliani   and   Miller   (1958).  
According   to   their   study,   firm   value   is   not   influenced   by   the   choice   of   capital  
structure,  which  is  irrelevant  to  both  firm  value  and  the  weighted  average  cost  of  
capital  (hence,  cost  of  capital).  The  cost  of  capital  is  constant  because,  according  
to  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958),   the  substituting  debt   for  equity  changes  the  risk  
associated   with   each   of   the   claims:   the   claim   of   shareholders   and   that   of  
debtholders,  which  is  less  risky.  Hence,  the  cost  of  debt  will  equivalently  reduce  
and  that  of  equity  will  rise  (the  reverse  case  also  holds).  According  to  M  &  M,  firms  
with  higher  leverage  tend  to  have  a  higher  return  during  good  times  and  a  lower  
return  during  bad  ones,  simply  because  they  are  associated  with  higher  systematic  
risks.  As  for  risk-­adjusted  returns,  the  theory  is  obviously  being  silent.    
2.2  Debt  financing  during  the  financial  crisis  
During  the  financial  crisis  in  2008,  banks  were  the  first  victim.  Intuitively,  this  
would  suggest  that  large  corporations  that  needed  to  finance  their  operation  with  
debt  were  the  next  to  be  hit.  Firms  may  have  found  themselves  in  a  situation  where  
they   did   not   have   the   funds   to   roll   over   existing   debt,   which   would   further  
complicate  the  situation.  Ivashina  and  Scharfstein  (2009)  found  that  new  loans  to  
large  borrowers  fell  by  47%  during  the  peak  of  the  financial  crisis  relative  to  the  
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prior  quarter  and  by  79%  relative  to  the  peak  of  the  credit  boom,  which  is  consistent  
with  this  assessment.  Furthermore,  new  lending  for  real  investment  fell  by  only  14%  
in   the   last  quarter  of  2008,  but  contracted  nearly  as  much  as  that   for  restricting  
relative   to   the  peak  of   the  credit   boom.  After   the   failure  of  Lehman  Brothers   in  
September  2008,  banks  had  difficulties  rolling  over  their  short-­term  debt.    
Pianeselli   and   Zaghini   (2013)   assessed   the   determinants   of   the   risk  
premium   paid   by   non-­financial   corporations   on   long-­term   bonds.   By   looking   at  
5500  issues  over  the  period  2005-­2012,  the  paper  finds  that,  in  comparison  with  
the   three-­year   period   of   2005-­2007   before   the   global   financial   crisis,   Italian,  
Spanish   and   Portuguese   firms   paid,   on   average,   70   to   120   basis   points   of  
additional   premium   during   2010-­2012   due   to   the   negative   spillovers   from   the  
sovereign  debt  crisis.    
Harrison  and  Widjaja  (2014)  investigated  the  difference  in  capital  structure  
before  and  after  the  financial  crisis.  They  found  that  the  coefficients  of  tangibility  
and  market-­to-­book  ratio  exerted  a  stronger  influence  on  capital  structure  choices  
during   the   2008   financial   crisis   than   prior   to   2008.   They   also   found   that   the  
coefficient  of  profitability  exerted  less  influence  on  capital  structure  choices  during  
the  crisis   than  before.  Further  analyses   indicated  that,  during  the  2008  financial  
crisis,  the  pecking  order  theory  had  more  explanatory  power  than  the  trade-­off  or  
market  timing  theory.    
2.3  Leverage  level  and  performance  
This   subsection   discusses   research   relating   to   the   long-­term   effect   of  
leverage   on   stock   return.   Bhandri   (1998)   found   a   positive   correlation   between  
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leverage   (measured   by   non-­common  equity   liabilities   to  market   value   of   equity  
ratio)   and   abnormal   stock   return   of   companies   trading   on   the  New  York  Stock  
Exchange.  The  expected  return  is  the  monthly  real  return  (adjusting  nominal  return  
by   inflation).  The  paper  also  controlled   for  beta  and   firm  size  and  excluded   the  
January  effect.  They  ranked  samples  into  3  groups  using  beta,  divided  each  into  3  
subgroups  based  on  firm  size,  and  further  broke  down  each  sub-­subgroup  into  3  
smaller  units  according  to   leverage  ratios,  obtaining  a   total  of  27  groups.  There  
was  a  high  variability  (variance  on  the  variables)  in  the  correlation  between  beta  
and  leverage  levels  across  different  periods  and  industries,  mainly  due  to  the  large  
leverage  employed  by  many  finance,  real  estate,  and  insurance  companies.  Finally,  
Bhandri  (1998)  ran  a  regression  on  manufacturing  firms  only,  which  have  a   low  
variability  between  beta  and  leverage  levels.    
Highly   leveraged   firms   have   lower   abnormal   returns   during   economic  
downturns.  Opler  and  Titman  (1994)  found  that  highly  leveraged  firms  tend  to  lose  
substantial   market   shares   to   their  more   conservatively   financed   competitors   in  
industry  downturns.  Moreover,  in  the  industries  that  experience  output  contractions,  
firms  at   the   top   leverage   level   found   that   the  decline   in   their   revenue  was  26%  
more  than  that   in  firms  with  low  leverage.  Similar  declines  are  also  found  in  the  
market  value  of  equity.  Their  research  result  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  indirect  
cost   of   financial   distress   is   significant   and   positive.   They   also   found   that   the  
adverse   consequences   of   leverage   are   more   pronounced   in   concentrated  
industries.    
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The  common  three-­factor  model  uses  book-­to-­market  equity  ratio  to  explain  
stock  return.  Fama  and  French  (1992  &  1995)  showed  that  firms  with  high  book-­
to-­market  equity  ratio  tend  to  make  less  earnings  compared  with  those  with  low  
book-­to-­market   equity   ratio,   which   is   similar   to   the   conclusion   of   the   study  
conducted  by  Chen  and  Zhang  (1998).  Thus,  book-­to-­market  equity  ratio  can  affect  
the  stock  return,  making  it  necessary  to  include  both  the  book  leverage  (long-­term  
debt  to  total  book  value  of  assets)  and  the  market  leverage  (total  debt  to  market  
value  of  equity).    
  7 
3.  Data  and  Methodology  
3.1  Data  
All   data   collected   in   this   research  were   from   the  period  of   2007-­2009   to  
study  the  effect  of  leverage  on  stock  return  of  firms  during  the  financial  crisis.      
3.1.1  Data  Sample  
   The  data  set  used  in  the  analysis  was  obtained  from  the  Wharton  Research  
Data  Services  (WRDS).  The  period  of  the  collected  data  starts  from  2007  and  ends  
in  2009,  that  is,  one  year  before  and  after  the  financial  crisis  in  2008.  And  the  entire  
data  set  was  downloaded  from  North  America  Market,  with  the  data  in  Financial  
(SIC  code  6)  and  Utility  (SIC  code  4)  Sectors  excluded  for  their  highly  regulated  
capital  structure,  because  this  research  had  taken  into  consideration  the  effect  of  
the   financial   crisis   on   changes   at   leverage   ratio   and   its   influence   on   abnormal  
returns.    
3.1.2  Balance  Sheet  Data  
   To  determine  leverage  ratio,  and  classify  firms  into  different  industry  sectors,  
18,781   observations   were   downloaded   from   Balance   Sheet   Data   (Compustat  
Annual  File),  including  AT  (Total  Asset),  DLTT  (Long-­Term  Total  Debt),  DT  (Total  
Debt),  MKVALT  (Total  Market  Value  of  Equity  at  Fiscal  Year),  and  SIC  (Standard  
Industry  Classification  Code).    
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3.1.3  Stock  Data  
   In  order  to  generate  stock  return  and  calculate  company  return  over  risk  
free  rate,  2,212,113  observations  were  obtained  from  Stock  Data  (CRSP  daily).  
Data  in  this  category  include  variables  of  RET  (Returns)  and  SHROUT  (number  
of  shares  outstanding).  
3.1.4  Fama-­French  Factors  
   To  regress  abnormal  return  with  the  Fama-­French  three-­factor  model  and  
Carhart   momentum   factor,   756   daily   observations   were   obtained   from   Fama-­
French  factors.  The  downloaded  daily  data  at  this  category  are  consistent  with  the  
daily  return  data.  Variables  include:  SMB  (Small-­Minus-­Big  Return),  HML  (High-­
Minus-­Low  Return),  RF  (Risk  Free  Return  Rate  measured  by  One  Month  Treasure  
Bill  Rate),  UMD  (Momentum  Factor),  and  MKTRF  (Excess  Return  on  the  Market).  
3.2  Methodology  
   Leverage   Ratio   was   calculated   using   data   that   had   been   downloaded.  
Companies  were  classified   into  different   leverage  ratio  groups   from   low   level   to  
high   level   as  of   2007.  Then  abnormal   return  was  measured  during  2008-­2009.  
Excess   risk-­free   return   of   companies  was   calculated   and   abnormal   return  was  
regressed   with   the   help   of   Fama-­French   three-­factor   model   and   Carhart  
Momentum  Factor.  Regression  of  abnormal  return  against  leverage  was  also  run  
to  test  leverage  effect  on  returns.  T-­test  had  been  applied  to  groups  of  abnormal  
return,  and  T-­Statistics  of  Coefficient  on  leverage  had  been  generated.    
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3.2.1  Leverage  Measurement  and  Grouping  
   To  ensure  robustness,  three  different  measurements  of  leverage  ratio  
were  used:  
   Book  long-­term  leverage  =  DLTT  /  AT  
   Book  leverage  groups  =  DT  /  AT  
   Market  leverage  groups  =  DLTT  /  (DLTT  +  MKVALT)  
   Then  three  sets  of  leverage  ratio  were  used  based  on  the  data  from  2007  
to  sort  firms  into  four  groups:  group  1  has  zero  Leverage,  and  groups  2  to  4  are  
equally  divided  among  the  number  of  observations  based  on  the  leverage  ratios.  
From  Table  2,  it  can  be  seen  that  there  are  12,670  observations  of  book  long-­term  
leverage  with   standard  deviation  of  0.339  and  a  mean  of  0.253.  And   there  are  
12,670  observations  of  book  leverage  ratio  with  standard  deviation  of  0.528  and  a  
mean  of  0.333.  In  addition,  there  are  10,783  observations  of  market  leverage  with  
standard  deviation  of  0.241  and  a  mean  of  0.223.  It  can  be  observed  from  Table  3  
that   the   range   of   leverage   ratio   from   group   1   to   4   varies   across   the   three  
measurements,  where  group  1  is  always  0.  Under  book  long-­term  leverage,  group  
2  ranges  from  0.000034%  to  8.91%,  group  3  from  8.92%  to  26.42%  and  group  4  
from  26.49%  to  178.59%.  As  of  book  leverage,  group  2  ranges  from  0.00004%  to  
11.06%,  group  3  from  11.07%  to  30.30%  and  group  4  from  30.31%  to  295.38%.  
Under  Book  long-­term  leverage,  group  2  ranges  from  0.0000092%  to  5.25%,  group  
3  from  5.26%  to  22.00%  and  group  4  from  22.02%  to  89.41%.        
Long-­term   total  debt,  compared  with   total  debt,  shows  better  and  clearer  
trends  of  debt  level  of  a  firm  over  the  long  run.  Market  asset  value  of  a  company  
offers  a  more  accurate  picture  of  the  situation  associated  with  the  organization.  As  
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the  measurements  of  book  long-­term  leverage  and  market  leverage  are  similar  to  
each  other,  their  means  of  group  are  very  close.  However,  book  long-­term  leverage  
has  a  higher  standard  deviation.  Moreover,  the  book  leverage  group  presents  the  
highest  mean  and  standard  deviation  among  three  measurements.    
3.2.2  Abnormal  Returns  
   To  measure  how  each  firm  over-­  or  under-­performs  the  market,  abnormal  
return  was  generated  for  each  of  them.  The  equation  used  for  this  regression  is  as  
follows:    
   R(t)-­RF(t)=a  +  b  x  MKTRF(t)  +  s  x  SMB(t)  +  h  x  HML(t)  +u  x  UMD(t)+  e(t)  
where  
   R  (t)  is  the  return  on  a  stock  portfolio,  
   RF  (t)  is  the  risk-­free  return  rate,  
   A  is  a  common  constant,  
   MKTRF(t)  is  the  excess  market  return  over  the  risk-­free  return  rate,  with
   the  market  return  being  the  value  weighted  return  on  all  stocks,    
   SMB  (t)  is  the  difference  between  small-­firms  return  and  big-­firms  return,    
   HML  (t)  is  the  difference  between  high  book-­to-­market  equity  return  and  
   low  book-­to-­market  equity  return,  showing  these  three  stock-­  market  
factors,    
   UMD  (t)  is  the  momentum  factor,  and  
   e  (t)  represents  the  error  term.  
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3.2.3  Leverage  and  Abnormal  returns  
   To  identify  and  test  the  relationship  between  abnormal  return  and  leverage  
effect,  two  sets  of  regressions  were  run  here  on  abnormal  abnormal  return  against  
leverage  ratio  and  leverage  groups,  one  with  dummy  factor  of  two-­digit  SIC  code,  
and  one  without.  The  linear  equations  used  for  this  regression  is  as  follows:  
   R_Abnormal  (t)  =  a  +  b  x  Leverage  (ratio  /  group)  +  i.SIC2g  
where  
   Leverage  ratio  represents  the  three  measurements  of  leverage,  
   Leverage  group  represents  group  number  from  1  to  4  associated  with  
each   company,  and  
   SIC2g  is  calculated  using  four-­digit  SIC  code  to  divide  100  to  widen  the  
   range  of  industry  sectors.  
   12  cross-­section  regressions  were  conducted.    
   Coefficient  and  t-­statistics  associated  with  it  on  different  Leverage  ratios  and  
groups  were  generated   to  help  understand   the   relationship  between  dependent  
and  independent  variables,  as  well  as  the  significant  level  of  such  relationship.  The  
period  of  above  regression   is   from  2008   to  2009,   the   two  years  of   the   financial  
crisis.  The  leverage  group  that  has  been  determined  here  is  measured  using  data  
from  2007.  
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3.2.4  T-­test  
   T-­tests   of   abnormal   return   in   2008  and   from  2008   to  2009  were  applied  
respectively   among   three   sets   of   different   leverage   groups.   Leverage   group   in  
2007  was  used,  which  is  the  year  before  the  occurrence  of  the  financial  crisis,  to  
avoid  the  effect  of  economy  depression  on  leverage.    
  13 
4.  Results:  
   Table  3  provides  the  mean  difference  of  abnormal  return  and  t-­test  result  
across   all   leverage   groups   in   the   year   2008,   where   firms   in   each   panel   were  
partitioned  to  4  groups  based  on  their  leverage  at  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year  2007.  
Group  1  consists  of  firms  with  zero  leverage,  and  groups  2-­4  are  equally  divided  
among  the  number  of  observations.  Alpha  is  the  intercept  of  a  regression  where  
the  dependent  variable  is  the  daily  excess  return,  and  the  independent  variables  
include  the  three  Fama  and  French  (1992)  and  Carhart  (1997)  momentum  factors.  
It  can  be  observed  from  the  table  that,  although  the  mean  of  groups  1  and  2  does  
not  show  significant  difference  between   the   two,   the  mean  differences  between  
Groups  2  and  3,  3  and  4,  as  well  as  4  and  1  are  significantly  different   from  the  
mean  of  abnormal  return.  The  result  does  not  show  a  clear  monotonic  relation,  and,  
even  more   surprisingly,   it   is   observed   from   the   figures   that   the  most   negative  
abnormal  return  is  for  Group  1,  indicating  that  higher  leverage  firms  do  better  than  
lower  leverage  ones.      
Table  4  has  been  structured  in  the  same  way  as  Table  3,  which  tests  the  
mean   difference   among   leverage   level   groups   in   2009.   The   results   concerning  
2009  seem  to  be  more  consistent  with  what  one  may  expect.  First,  there  appears  
to   be   a  monotonic   relationship   (more   or   less)   between   leverage   and   abnormal  
return.  It  can  be  observed  from  the  figures  that  the  lower  leverage  groups  tend  to  
have  a  higher  abnormal  return,  particularly  for  all  three  leverage  measurements,  
where  the  abnormal  return  for  group  1  is  significantly  higher  than  that  of  group  4.  
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Hence,  it   is  evident  that,  during  the  recovery  stage  of  the  financial  crisis  (during  
2009),  a  low  leverage  would  be  of  benefit  for  firms.    
Next,  a  regression  framework  was  used  to  analyze  the  effect  of  leverage  on  
abnormal   return,   which   will   help   control   for   industry   effects.   Table   5   provides  
regression  results  where  the  dependent  variable   is   the  abnormal  return   in  2008  
and  2009  (intercept  of  the  four-­factor  model).  The  independent  variables  are  either  
a  group  leverage  measure  in  the  form  of  a  number  from  1-­4,  or  the  leverage  ratio  
measure  that  is  the  continuous  variable  measured  in  2007.  Specifications  (4)-­(6)  
and  (10)-­(12)  also  include  industry  indicators.  As  can  be  observed  from  the  table,  
leverage   ratios   based   on   three   different  measurements   are   all   associated  with  
significant  negative  coefficients  with  or  without   the  control  variable  of  SIC  code.  
We   found   that,   compared  with   the   regression   result   of  abnormal   return  against  
leverage  ratio  without  control  variable  of  SIC  code,  the  one  with  the  control  variable  
shows   a   higher   R   square.   Higher   R   square   refers   to   a   closer   fit   of   data   and  
regression   line.   This   result   is   consistent   with   the   hypothesis   in   this   study   that  
leverage   would   have   a   negative   impact   on   abnormal   return   of   firms   during  
economy   depression.   The   coefficient   of   leverage   group   does   not   appear   to   be  
significant,   implying  that   the  partitioning  to  groups  might  also  be  responsible,   to  
some   extent,   for   the   inability   to   find   consistent   results   in   the   univariate   group  
analysis  of  Tables  3  and  4.	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5.  Conclusion  
This  study  analyzes   the  effect  of   leverage  on  abnormal   return  during   the  
financial   crisis.   One   of   the   main   effects   of   leverage   is   acceleration   of   the  
development  of  a  firm  in  both  positive  and  negative  directions.  Leverage  can  lower  
the  initial  cash  requirement  on  a  company  when  taking  up  a  project.  With  the  above  
reasons,  leverage  will  cause  firms  to  grow  or  decline  at  a  faster  rate,  when  they  
are  able  or  fail  to  generate  return  from  projects.  The  test  result  partially  proves  that  
there  is  a  significant  difference  of  mean  returns  among  different  leverage  groups,  
and   that   the   three  measurements  of   leverage   ratio   can  ensure   the   robustness.  
Results  also  show  that  there  is  no  significant  difference  in  abnormal  return  between  
certain  higher  leverage  and  lower  leverage  firms,  which  can  be  explained  by  the  
possibility   that   higher   leverage   firms   already   have   debt   in   place   to   cover   the  
negative  impact  of  the  financial  crisis.       
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6.  Appendix:  
Appendix  –  A:  Tables  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of corporate data for the year 2007, 2008 and 2009 taken 
from Compustat (in millions of dollars). Market value of equity is share price 
at the end of the year times number of shares outstanding. Total assets are 
from Compustat 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of three different leverage measures: Book long term 
leverage = Total Long-term Debt / Total Asset, Book leverage = Total Debt / 
Total Asset, Market leverage = Total Long-term Debt / (Total Long-term 
Debt + Total Market Value of equity). 
 
	   Observation	   Standard	  Deviation	   Mean	   p5	   p25	   p50	   p75	   p95	   min	   max	  
Total	  Asset	   12670	   21338.120	   4318.695	   3.294	   51.699	   313.831	   1689.350	   17487	   0.001	   797769	  
Total	  Debt	   12670	   7737.133	   1085.507	   0.12	   4.007	   46.710	   428.460	   4122	   0.001	   447427	  
Long-­‐term	  
Debt	   12670	   6318.458	   938.046	   0	   1.958	   33.098	   391.60	   3746	   0	   377138	  
Market	  Value	  
of	  Equity	   10783	   14204.620	   2729.737	   2.878	   29.814	   192.611	   1021.183	   9495.84	   0.001	   504239.600	  
	   Observation	  
Standard	  




12670	   0.339	   0.252	   0	   0.034	   0.162	   0.331	   0.771	   0	   2.184	  
Book	  
Leverage	   12670	   0.528	   0.333	   0.0025	   0.073	   0.207	   0.384	   0.954	   0.00039	   3.830	  
Market	  
Leverage	   10783	   0.241	   0.223	   0	   0.0222	   0.141	   0.344	   0.755	   0	   0.945	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Table 3. This table provides difference of means t-test across different leverage groups in 
the year 2008, where in each panel we partition firms to 4 groups based on 
their leverage at end of fiscal 2007. Group 1 are firms with leverage of zero, 
and groups 2-4 are equally divided based on the number of firms, where 
group 4 is the highest leverage group. Alpha is the intercept of a regression 
where the dependent variable is the daily excess return and the independent 
variables are the three Fama and French (1992) and Carhart (1997) 
momentum factors. The right column presents difference of mean (t-statistic) 
in alpha across two consecutive groups. The bottom line presents difference 
of mean (t-statistic) in alpha between group 4 and group 1. Leverage 
definition defined in Table 1. *, **, *** represents significance at the 10%, 
5%, 1% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Book long-term leverage groups 
Group	   Number	  of	  Firms	   Mean	  Alpha	   Standard	  Deviation	   Range	  of	  Ratio	   Difference	  compare	  to	  above	  group	  
1	   697	   -­‐0.093	   0.27	   0	   	  	  
2	   645	   -­‐0.081	   0.257	   0.00034%	  to	  8.91%	  
0.012	  
-­‐0.8	  
3	   709	   -­‐0.024	   0.24	   8.92%	  to	  26.42%	  
0.058***	  
-­‐4.26	  
4	   548	   -­‐0.055	   0.264	   26.49%	  to	  178.59	  
-­‐0.031**	  
(-­‐2.20)	  
4	  minus	  1	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   0.037***	  
	  	   -­‐2.47	  
 
Panel B: Book leverage groups 
Group	   Number	  of	  Firms	   Mean	  Alpha	   Standard	  Deviation	   Range	  of	  Ratio	   Difference	  compared	  to	  above	  group	  
1	   628	   -­‐0.091	   0.273	   0	   	  	  
2	   700	   -­‐0.075	   0.251	   0.0004%	  to	  11.06%	  
0.016	  
-­‐1.08	  
3	   734	   -­‐0.026	   0.242	   11.07%	  to	  30.30%	  
0.049***	  
-­‐3.77	  
4	   536	   -­‐0.059	   0.272	   30.31%	  to	  295.38%	  
-­‐0.032**	  
(-­‐2.23)	  
4	  minus	  1	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   0.032**	  
	  	   -­‐2.01	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Panel C: Market leverage groups 
Group	   Number	  of	  Firm	   Mean	  Alpha	   Standard	  Deviation	   Range	  of	  Ratio	   Difference	  compared	  to	  above	  group	  
1	   697	   -­‐0.095	   0.269	   0	   	  	  
2	   632	   -­‐0.078	   0.257	   0.000092%	  to	  5.25%	  
0.017	  
-­‐1.15	  
3	   700	   -­‐0.022	   0.232	   5.26%	  to	  22.00%	  
0.056***	  
-­‐4.14	  
4	   570	   -­‐0.066	   0.27	   22.02%	  to	  89.41%	  
-­‐0.044***	  
(-­‐3.09)	  
4	  minus	  1	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   0.029**	  
	  	   -­‐1.87	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Table 4. This table provides difference of means t-test across different leverage groups in 
the year 2009, where in each panel we partition firms to 4 groups based on 
their leverage at end of fiscal 2007. Group 1 are firms with leverage of zero, 
and groups 2-4 are equally divided based on the number of firms, where 
group 4 is the highest leverage group. Alpha is the intercept of a regression 
where the dependent variable is the daily excess return and the independent 
variables are the three Fama and French (1990) and Carhart (1997) 
momentum factors. The right column presents difference of mean (t-statistic) 
in alpha across two consecutive groups. The bottom line presents difference 
of mean (t-statistic) in alpha between group 4 and group 1. Leverage 
definition defined in Table 1. *, **, *** represents significance at the 10%, 
5%, 1% level respectively.  
 
Panel A: Book long-term leverage groups 
Group	   Number	  of	  Firms	   Mean	  Alpha	   Standard	  Deviation	   Range	  of	  Ratio	   Difference	  compare	  to	  above	  group	  
1	   656	   0.089	   0.263	   0	   	  	  
2	   628	   0.055	   0.229	   0.00034%	  to	  8.91%	  
-­‐0.035***	  
(-­‐2.50)	  
3	   684	   0.039	   0.206	   8.92%	  to	  26.42%	  
-­‐0.015	  
(-­‐1.26)	  
4	   522	   0.036	   0.242	   26.49%	  to	  178.59	  
-­‐0.0038	  
(-­‐0.29)	  
4	  minus	  1	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   -­‐0.054***	  
	  	   (-­‐3.59)	  
 
Panel B: Book leverage groups 
Group	   Number	  of	  Firms	   Mean	  Alpha	   Standard	  Deviation	   Range	  of	  Ratio	   Difference	  compare	  to	  above	  group	  
1	   595	   0.091	   0.265	   0	   	  	  
2	   676	   0.062	   0.224	   0.0004%	  to	  11.06%	  
-­‐0.030**	  
(-­‐2.16)	  
3	   710	   0.04	   0.206	   11.07%	  to	  30.30%	  
-­‐0.021*	  
(-­‐1.84)	  
4	   509	   0.036	   0.256	   30.31%	  to	  295.38%	  
-­‐0.0045	  
(-­‐0.33)	  
4	  minus	  1	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   -­‐0.056	  ***	  
	  	   (-­‐3.52)	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Panel C: Market leverage groups 
Group	   Number	  of	  Firms	   Mean	  Alpha	   Standard	  Deviation	   Range	  of	  Ratio	   Difference	  compare	  to	  above	  group	  
1	   656	   0.087	   0.261	   0	   	  	  
2	   616	   0.047	   0.219	   0.000092%	  to	  5.25%	  
-­‐0.040***	  
(-­‐2.91)	  
3	   676	   0.035	   0.192	   5.26%	  to	  22.00%	  
-­‐0.012	  
(-­‐1.05)	  
4	   541	   0.044	   0.262	   22.02%	  to	  89.41%	  
0	  .0096	  
-­‐0.73	  
4	  minus	  1	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   -­‐0.	  042***	  
	  	   (-­‐2.76)	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Table 5. The table provides regression results where the dependent variable is the alpha 
in 2008 and 2009 (intercept of the four-factor model). The independent 
variables are either a group leverage measure (a number, 1-4), or the 
leverage measure (the continuous variable) as measured in 2007. Half of the 
specifications include industry indicators as controls. *, **, *** represents 
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.  
 
Specification	  number	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
Long-­‐term	  leverage	  group	  	   0.0016	  (0.33)	   	   	  
0.0033	  	  	  
(0.65)	   	   	  
Book	  leverage	  group	   	   -­‐0.0015	  (-­‐0.32)	   	   	  
-­‐0.00017	  
(-­‐0.03)	   	  
Market	  leverage	  group	   	   	   -­‐0.000068	  	  (-­‐0.01)	  	   	   	  
0.0011	  
(0.21)	  
Industry	  indicator	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Number	  of	  firms	  (obs)	   5089	   5088	   5088	   5089	   5088	   5088	  
R-­‐squared	   0.0000	   0.0000	   0.0000	   0.014	   0.014	   0.0142	  
Specification	  number	   (7)	   (8)	   (9)	   (10)	   (11)	   (12)	  
Long-­‐term	  leverage	   -­‐0.050*	  	  (-­‐2.13)	   	   	  
-­‐0.049*	  
(-­‐1.95)	   	   	  
Book	  leverage	   	   -­‐0.057**	  (-­‐2.82)	   	   	  
-­‐0.055*	  	  
(-­‐2.57)	   	  
Market	  leverage	   	   	   -­‐0.176***	  	  (-­‐7.93)	   	   	  
-­‐0.197***	  
(-­‐8.16)	  
Industry	  indicator	   No	   No	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Number	  of	  firms	  (obs)	   5089	   5088	   5088	   5089	   5088	   5088	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Appendix  –  B:  Figures  
Figure 1. Alpha trends from 2007 to 2009 associated with Book long-term leverage 
group 
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